Key facts
- Huntress found many technicians still running ScreenConnect host clients on versions 22.x, 24.2, and 25.8 weeks after the fix shipped.
- Huntress confirmed attackers actively exploited CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect against MSP technician accounts.
- On November 12, 2026, a technician at one MSP joined a blank-named Access session using a ScreenConnect host client.
- Exploiting CVE-2026-84869 lets a guest send a file to the technician's computer and make the technician's ScreenConnect host client run it.
Huntress confirmed attackers actively exploited CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect against MSP technician accounts.
The intrusion moved quickly. A technician at one MSP entered a blank-named Access session using a ScreenConnect host client on Nov. 12, 2026. Roughly nine seconds later, a rogue ScreenConnect client pretending to be Windows Update appeared on that technician’s workstation.
A guest who exploits CVE-2026-84869 can place a file on the technician’s computer and force the technician’s ScreenConnect host client to run it. ConnectWise’s advisory said a guest could trigger file transfers processed by the technician’s host client without authorization or confirmation, including elevated execution. The technician receives no warning and must only enter the session for the file to run.
The campaign generated 688,000 guest requests to execute files named update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat. Those requests originated from 29 IP addresses spanning 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers between Oct. 20, 2026, and Nov. 16, 2026. Huntress assessed with high confidence that the operator behind the spray and the operator behind masterdarky[.]com are the same. The busiest server saw 10 guest sessions from seven IP addresses generate 70,414 requests across three weeks.
Huntress tracked repeated file sprays across the servers. Attackers sprayed update_224ac089.bat across five MSP ScreenConnect servers at 16:03 UTC on Nov. 12, 2026, and it arrived 43 minutes before the observed full compromise. Servers each received update_224ac089.bat between 585 and 5,671 times, with three servers still getting the file on Nov. 16, 2026. Those same sessions had pushed update_c99a4b29.bat on Nov. 11, 2026.
A canary test confirmed the technique before real payloads arrived. At 01:49 UTC on Nov. 13, 2026, a technician at another MSP entered a session that appeared to be a laptop. The guest from 91.224.92[.]167 sent marker.txt, and the technician’s client executed it roughly three seconds later inside Notepad++. Huntress called the marker.txt event a canary that confirms the exploit works before attackers send a real payload.
Earlier probes showed the same IP testing access. The same IP pushed marker.txt to a technician at a separate MSP three times during late October 2026 while that technician stayed connected, and Huntress could not confirm that the client executed the file. An intruder entered as a guest in three genuine technician-created support sessions and asked for execution of a Startup-folder path on Oct. 23, 24, and 27, 2026, using IP addresses 193.26.115[.]63 and 57.128.131[.]66. Two of the technicians targeted in those Startup-folder requests used vulnerable Windows clients, while the third used a Mac client where the Windows Startup path failed.
A typical MSP technician workstation holds RMM consoles, stored credentials, and access to every customer, which makes it a prime target. Huntress discovered that many technicians remained on ScreenConnect host client versions 22.x, 24.2, and 25.8 even though weeks had passed since the fix shipped.
ConnectWise revealed CVE-2026-84869 on Sept. 8, 2026, assigning it a CVSS score of 9.9. ConnectWise classifies CVE-2026-84869 as CVSS 3.1 score 9.9 Critical and labels it Important/Priority 1. CISA placed CVE-2026-84869 in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on Sept. 11, 2026, and Huntress said active exploitation of the flaw began on Aug. 20, 2026.
ScreenConnect client versions before 26.6.5 contain the flaw, while ScreenConnect servers remain unaffected. ConnectWise identified 26.6.5 as the patched version for both ScreenConnect host clients and Access agents. Shadowserver counts more than 1,000 unpatched and exposed ScreenConnect instances online, with 758 in North America and 180 in Europe.
Attackers launched ScreenConnect Run commands against cloud-hosted MSP instances starting Nov. 11, 2026, installing rogue ScreenConnect clients on hundreds of managed endpoints. Microsoft Threat Intelligence verified ConnectWise’s reported activity from Nov. 11, 2026 and saw the SCKit worm deployed on ConnectWise customer managed endpoints. The SCKit operation also used session-cookie relays in its worm-like behavior.
Huntress described SCKit as a relay trap rather than a direct exploit. The RelayTrap component of SCKit attempts a Guest-to-Host file execution method tied to CVE-2026-84869. Huntress said SCKit does not directly exploit CVE-2026-84869, instead staging it as a relay trap for later technician connections. Blackpoint Cyber ran the SCKit reverse transfer against a current ScreenConnect release and determined that the technician-side Host never requested or executed the payload.
Microsoft detailed the access the worm achieves. The SCKit worm hits technician workstations via a hijacked authenticated ScreenConnect session and pushes payloads to other managed devices through the victim’s management console, Microsoft says. That access lets threat actors manage affected endpoints remotely, run commands, and install other tools outside the legitimate support instance, Microsoft says.
Removal alone is insufficient, Microsoft warned. Microsoft says removing an unauthorized client alone does not wipe the toolkit’s persistence or end exposed web sessions.
Huntress urged immediate patching of technician clients. Huntress advised updating every technician’s ScreenConnect host client to version 26.6.5 or newer, together with every Access agent that ConnectWise lists. Patching only the ScreenConnect server does not fix CVE-2026-84869 since the vulnerable code runs on the technician’s host client. On-premises ScreenConnect installations need version 25.4 or higher before they can move to client version 26.6.5.
Interim mitigations can limit exposure while patching proceeds. When patching cannot happen right away, ConnectWise advises removing the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups as a temporary measure. Huntress advised limiting which users can join sessions as guests and checking guest permissions on Support sessions. Huntress also advised gating the ScreenConnect web interface and installer downloads behind IP or VPN restrictions and avoiding unattended sessions that cannot be linked to a customer.
Huntress provided server and network detection guidance. Huntress told administrators to review server session data for guest-originated RanFiles (EventType 85) or SentFiles (86) events, with attention to repeated update.bat or update_<8hex>.bat requests in blank-named sessions. Huntress said to watch for outbound ScreenConnect relay connections on port 8041 pointing to domains outside the organization.
Containment guidance starts with isolating the affected workstation. Huntress told responders to isolate an affected technician workstation and terminate the rogue client. Huntress said to delete %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<id> and wupdate_<id>.msi, return seclogon to its standard start type, and rotate all reachable credentials. Those reachable credentials cover RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password vault, and customer admin accounts.
Responders should assume broad access after a hit. Huntress said that when a hit is found, responders should operate on the assumption that the attacker saw anything the technician could see. Huntress said technicians should monitor ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe for execution of .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js, or .txt files from Documents\\Temp\ on technician workstations. Huntress advised removing blank-named guest sessions that repeatedly request update.bat files, since they return and administrators should check again.
A separate campaign used crypto-themed session names. A distinct campaign on Nov. 13, 2026 put unauthorized guest sessions, masked with crypto exchange names, on more than 100 MSP ScreenConnect servers. Every one of the five sessions that sprayed update_224ac089.bat, together with 27 spray sessions spanning 17 servers, assigned crypto client to the session Company property CustomProperty1. Huntress said crypto-named session names could draw a technician into opening a session and executing a malicious file, although Huntress did not observe that use.
CISA framed the flaw as a recurring federal risk. CISA stated that the flaw may permit an attacker to transfer and run files through an active remote session without authorization or host confirmation. ConnectWise serves over 100,000 IT providers around the world, and many MSPs and IT teams rely on ScreenConnect for troubleshooting, patching, and system maintenance.

Join the discussion