Key facts
- In March 2026, hackers who hijacked Trivy planted malicious code that appeared to come from GitHub's official checkout tool.
- Attackers compromised nearly every release of Aqua Security's Trivy vulnerability scanner during an ongoing supply chain attack.
- Attackers found a way to circumvent SHA pinning.
- The attackers labeled the malicious Trivy code a security fix.
In March 2026, attackers who hijacked Aqua Security’s Trivy vulnerability scanner planted malicious code that appeared to come from GitHub’s official checkout tool, and teams that pinned to the compromised Trivy code would have passed every check.
Attackers compromised nearly every release of Aqua Security’s Trivy vulnerability scanner during an ongoing supply chain attack. The impersonation worked because GitHub allows copies of a project called forks to share code with the original project, and fork commits are eligible for pinning. The attackers labeled the malicious Trivy code a security fix, so teams that pinned to it passed every check. Pinning guarantees code will not change but not who wrote it, and org-level enforcement verifies a 40-character SHA reference without confirming the commit exists in the upstream project.
The same impersonation technique struck the actions-cool/issues-helper tool in May 2026, taking credentials from pipelines that ran it. Even with a pinned SHA, a Docker-based action can build its image at runtime and pull unfrozen dependencies. SHA pinning has become the primary defense against software supply chain attacks, and attackers found a way to circumvent it.
More CI code from agentic development means these gaps face more frequent use and less close review. Commit authorship and runtime builds remain unresolved. In March 2025, the tj-actions/changed-files compromise redirected tags to a malicious commit across over 23,000 repositories, and SHA-pinned teams were not affected. Administrators can enforce pinning across an organization through GitHub policy settings.
GitHub published its 2026 Actions security roadmap on March 26, 2026, putting deterministic dependency locking front and center. Public preview for workflow lockfiles began on October 14, 2026, and general availability followed on October 28, 2026. Workflow lockfiles connect each run to recorded commits for actions and dependencies, even when tags move later. Because locked commits must exist on a source repository branch, lockfiles blunt fork-only impostors.
According to GitHub’s changelog, locking does not establish whether a dependency is safe. Immutable releases help only when maintainers opt in. GitHub Enterprise Server does not currently support lockfiles, and other ways to close the trust gap include a curated catalog of vetted actions.
Trivy maintainer Itay Shakury confirmed the scanner compromise on Friday, and the intrusion started early Thursday morning. Trivy is a vulnerability scanner developers use to find vulnerabilities and hardcoded authentication secrets in pipelines, and the scanner shows 33,200 GitHub stars.
Using stolen credentials, the actor force-pushed all but one trivy-action tag and seven setup-trivy tags to point to malicious dependencies. Force-pushing uses a git command to override default protections against overwriting existing commits. Socket and Wiz said the malware in 75 compromised tags searches pipelines for secrets such as GitHub tokens and cloud credentials. Spoofed tags include @0.34.2, @0.33, and @0.18.0, and @0.35.0 is the only version that appears unaffected.
On March 20, Aqua Security said the threat actor accessed its GitHub organization because of incomplete containment of an earlier incident targeting the same tool. The access let the attacker inject TeamPCP Cloud stealer credential-harvesting code into Trivy and publish malicious versions. On March 20, Aqua released safe Trivy versions and hired Sygnia for remediation and forensics.
Socket found compromised Trivy artifacts on Docker Hub, and Socket researchers report that image tags 0.69.5 and 0.69.6 appeared on March 22 without matching GitHub releases or tags. Trivy’s most recent known release is version 0.69.3. Because Docker Hub tags are not immutable, tag names alone do not establish integrity.
Aqua identified more suspicious behavior on March 22 after the threat actors restored improper access and made unapproved changes and repository tampering. According to Aqua, Trivy was not affected at that time.
Hackers used an automation script to apply the tpcp-docs- prefix to all 44 repositories and set descriptions to TeamPCP Owns Aqua Security. OpenSourceMalware has high confidence the attacker compromised a service account named Argon-DevOps-Mgt to access both Aqua Security GitHub organizations. The Argon-DevOps-Mgt service account used a standard user Personal Access Token instead of a GitHub App. Personal Access Token authentication works like a password and remains valid longer than a GitHub App token, and service accounts typically handle automated tasks and lack multifactor authentication protection.
TeamPCP created branch update-plugin-links-v0.218.2 in aquasecurity/trivy-plugin-aqua and deleted it at the exact same second. Researchers believe hackers obtained the Argon-DevOps-Mgt Personal Access Token using the TeamPCP Cloud stealer, and the runner environment contained the token for Argon-DevOps-Mgt, which triggered workflows on trivy-plugin-aqua. Aqua Security says no evidence shows attackers impacted the Trivy version in its commercial products, and the forked version of Aqua’s commercial platform trails Trivy open source through a controlled integration process.
GTIG attributes attacks on Trivy, LiteLLM, and Telnyx on PyPI to TeamPCP, which GTIG calls UNC6780. GTIG researchers say hundreds of thousands of stolen secrets may be circulating from these attacks.
GitHub said about 3,800 internal repositories had data stolen by attackers, and it sees no evidence of customer data impact outside internal repositories. GitHub said it detected and contained an employee device compromise involving a poisoned VS Code extension.
TechCrunch reported that The Record and Bleeping Computer say TeamPCP claimed the GitHub breach and offered the data for sale. TeamPCP claimed credit for a European Commission breach involving more than 90 gigabytes of cloud storage data, and hackers stole the European Commission’s cloud key during an earlier Trivy breach by pushing info-stealing malware to downstream users.
The March 2026 Trivy compromise involved attackers pinning malicious fork commits that mimicked official tools and passed every check. Workflow lockfiles and organization-wide pinning do not establish whether a dependency is safe, and lockfiles are unavailable on GitHub Enterprise Server. Immutable releases only help when maintainers opt in.

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