Key facts
- Cisco Talos reports malware operators are shifting C2 infrastructure from centralized servers and hardcoded domains to decentralized blockchain networks to eliminate single points of failure.
- Talos says defenders should move from static domain blocklists to monitoring unusual outbound JSON-RPC traffic, endpoint memory analysis, and treating blockchain as active threat channel.
- Glupteba queried public Electrum servers for transactions tied to hardcoded script hashes, then decoded AES-encrypted payloads holding active domains and backup addresses.
- Early crimeware and Cerber ransomware versions from 2016 and 2017 checked Bitcoin output amounts and addresses, plus block explorer APIs, to form seeds that drive pseudorandom domain creation.
Cisco Talos reported that operators of malware are abandoning central servers and hardcoded domains for decentralized blockchain networks, a move intended to remove single points of failure.
Operators use unchangeable public ledgers, including Bitcoin transactions, EVM smart contracts, TRON wallets and Solana memo programs, to hold, conceal and refresh operational endpoints. Malicious software pulls encrypted command-and-control configurations via read-only remote procedure calls straight into compromised endpoint memory, avoiding traditional perimeter defenses and domain seizures.
Traditional command-and-control depends on hardcoded domains or IPs that defenders can disrupt using hosting null-routes, registrar suspensions, law enforcement seizures, and blocklist updates. Because blockchain-based command-and-control removes single points of failure, defenders cannot use registrar-level domain seizures, hosting takedowns, or DNS sinkholing when records live across immutable nodes.
Use of the Bitcoin blockchain as a command-and-control configuration channel started around 2016 to 2019. Versions of crimeware and Cerber ransomware from 2016 and 2017 checked Bitcoin output amounts and addresses plus block explorer APIs to build seeds for pseudorandom domain creation. In September 2019, Trend Micro researchers identified a Glupteba botnet variant using Bitcoin transactions to refresh active command-and-control servers. The botnet queried public Electrum servers for transactions linked to hardcoded script hashes, then decoded AES-encrypted payloads containing active domains and backup addresses.
In October 2023, security researchers documented EtherHiding as threat actors used contracts on the network now called BNB Smart Chain for anonymous hosting to bypass domain takedowns. EtherHiding converts smart contracts into dead drop resolvers by storing encoded command-and-control addresses in contract variables, retrievable through eth_call without creating on-chain transaction footprints.
In October 2025, researchers said UNC5142, a financially motivated group linked to ClearFake, pioneered EtherHiding. ClearFake relied on Cloudflare workers to push drive-by lures and fake browser updates, then moved to blockchain records after cloud providers took down that setup.
Security researchers disclosed in October 2025 that UNC5342, a North Korean state-sponsored cluster connected to Contagious Interview, used EtherHiding against cryptocurrency developers. The group stored second-stage payloads and active command-and-control endpoints in custom BNB Smart Chain contracts for JADESNOW and INVISIBLEFERRET malware. Within a few months, UNC5342 changed its blockchain configuration more than 20 times. Iranian state-sponsored actors and UNC5342 also rely on TRON as a primary channel, hiding encoded routing information in wallet transactions.
In March 2026, the Lazarus APT group was first seen using Solana memo transactions for command-and-control configuration hosting. In September 2026, Talos detected malicious activity involving North Korea-aligned actor UAT-12643, including use of the Overlord RAT and Solana blockchain command-and-control discovery. On Solana, UAT-12643 records encrypted command-and-control web addresses through the Solana Memo Program.
Talos researchers anticipate that on-chain command-and-control pipelines will move toward multichain fallback designs, linking queries across several cryptocurrency networks to sidestep blocks in any single ecosystem. If commercial RPC gateways add tighter abuse detections, attackers will likely direct RPC calls through decentralized relay networks, private channels, or zero-knowledge proof tools. Following blockchain dead drop activity calls for viewing public ledgers as an active channel for adversary communications, not merely financial records.
The Solana Memo Program checks arbitrary strings such as UTF-8 text or Base64-encoded binary data and writes them directly into transaction execution logs. Malicious software queries public Solana JSON-RPC endpoints using getSignaturesForAddress and getTransaction to pull the newest confirmed transaction from a controlled wallet. It extracts the payload from memo instruction logs, reads the decrypted destination while it sits in memory, and then starts network beacons toward the command-and-control address it resolved.
If an IP or domain is sinkholed, the actor transmits a fresh Solana transaction with an updated memo payload, and malicious software fetches it on the next polling cycle without binary updates. Solana handles more than 65,000 transactions per second and confirms blocks in roughly 0.4 seconds, outpacing Bitcoin’s seven TPS and Ethereum’s 15 to 30 TPS baseline. Each Solana transaction costs an average of roughly U.S. $0.000025 in execution fees.
High fees, confirmation latencies and 80-byte payload limits on Bitcoin pushed campaigns toward smart contract ecosystems and memo programs. Smart contracts are persistent entities storing data that can be modified over time, unlike ephemeral standard transactions.

Reported initially in September 2026, TRON multichain fallback systems resist seizures. To retrieve transaction records, extract keys or pointers, and connect to secondary contracts, implants query public TRON APIs. Nominal overhead, high throughput and massive legitimate volume on TRON force simultaneous disruptions across multiple ecosystems.
The Solana Memo Program is a native pre-deployed runtime utility that validates arbitrary strings and records them in execution logs. Each micro-value Solana transaction calling the Memo Program carries encrypted command-and-control IP addresses or staging domains.
Talos says defenders should abandon static domain blocklists in favor of watching unusual outbound JSON-RPC traffic, performing endpoint memory analysis, and treating blockchain as an active threat channel. When those services are not required for business, monitoring or blocking outbound connections to public node providers such as Infura, QuickNode, and Tatum can shrink the attack surface.
To detect abuse, defenders should establish a baseline of normal developer or business activity and alert on frequent automated calls to eth_call, getTransaction, and getSignaturesForAddress. Network teams should examine payloads using JSON-RPC for strange encoded data and unusual lengths. Before lightweight in-memory decrypters unpack and beacon to resolved command-and-control destinations, endpoint telemetry should focus on spotting them.
Domain generation algorithms (DGAs), CDN domain fronting, peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures and dead drop resolvers are previous resilience techniques that still rely on centralized infrastructure able to be neutralized. DGAs generate hundreds or thousands of pseudorandom domains on a schedule using a shared mathematical seed. To counter DGAs, defenders reverse engineer seeds, predict domains for sinkholing, and apply machine learning to DNS queries.
A TLS handshake pairs a legitimate CDN domain with a covert malicious host in the HTTP Host header to define CDN domain fronting. Cloud providers and carriers dismantled domain fronting because they standardized routing and matched TLS Server Name Indication to internal headers. Commands, updates, and data move directly between infected peers through custom overlay routing under P2P architectures. Defenders can enumerate P2P topology when they act as benign nodes, map peer lists, and isolate infected machines.
Dead drop resolvers stash command-and-control coordinates using outside services such as image metadata, code repository commits, and social media bios. Defenders contain dead drop resolvers through account suspensions by providers, content removal, and monitoring of automated outbound API requests. Confirmed transactions turn into permanent records replicated worldwide on a public blockchain, which works as a distributed append-only ledger. No single cloud provider, law enforcement agency, or other entity can delete, overwrite, or withhold blockchain-embedded configuration data.
IP addresses, domains, or instructions embedded in blockchain remain highly available and persistent no matter the regional takedowns. Payment trails, registrar records, or traffic to centralized hosts expose operators using traditional command-and-control. Cheaper wallets carry pseudo-anonymous blockchain transactions, while retrieving configs mimics benign RPC API lookups or block explorer scraping.
Cisco Talos describes the command-and-control channel as the backbone of operations and the most fragile part of persistent malware campaigns. The campaign’s operational capability collapses when command-and-control infrastructure is reported to hosting providers, registrars, or law enforcement. One infrastructure link is all defenders need to disrupt an operation, driving an arms race from fast flux DNS toward decentralized architectures.
IP addresses are null-routed by hosting providers, domains are suspended by registrars, infrastructure is seized by law enforcement, and blocklists are pushed across endpoints by threat intelligence vendors. Botnets are disrupted, victim communities are mapped, forensic telemetry is gathered, and affected organizations are notified by researcher-controlled sinkholes.

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