Key facts
- Unit 42 observed Com-affiliated threat actors conducting vishing attacks since August 2026, targeting healthcare, financial services, and legal organizations primarily in the U.S., UK, and Australia.
- CL-CRI-1264 attackers enrolled unauthorized MFA devices, including a reused device named Pixel 10a, within minutes of authenticating to establish persistence.
- CL-CRI-1264 used Microsoft Teams to send extortion messages to employees at victim organizations, alleging data theft and pointing them to Tor-hosted negotiation sites.
- CL-CRI-1274 bypassed Duo MFA through vishing by replaying a persistent session token from proxy infrastructure that maintains a keep me signed in state.
Since August 2026, Unit 42 has observed Com-affiliated threat actors carrying out vishing attacks against healthcare, financial services and legal organizations primarily in the U.S., UK and Australia.
In August 2026, financial services organizations drew about twice the targeting volume of healthcare organizations. The actors moved their focus from financial services to healthcare in early September 2026, and healthcare led targeting by October 2026. Australian organizations made up less than 1% of observed subdomains in August and September, then about 13% in October, placing them second behind the United States.
Unit 42 says it has handled cases tied to Bling Libra and other Com-affiliated actors dating back to early 2026, before the August 2026 acceleration visible in its telemetry. Unit 42 describes the groups as sharing infrastructure, tactics and victimology patterns. The affiliates include Bling Libra, also called ShinyHunters, and clusters CL-CRI-1116 (Redact), CL-CRI-1147 (Pink), CL-CRI-1182 (Falcon), CL-CRI-1192 (Helix), CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder).
In September 2026, cluster CL-CRI-1264, which Unit 42 tracks as Vortex, primarily targeted healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical organizations. The attackers used vishing to impersonate IT support and directed employees to adversary-in-the-middle proxy servers, which intercept login credentials and multifactor authentication approvals in real time.
CL-CRI-1264 enrolled unauthorized MFA devices, including a reused device named Pixel 10a, shortly after authenticating to maintain access. It automated data exfiltration using Python scripts carrying the python-httpx User Agent to target Microsoft 365 mailboxes, OneDrive and SharePoint. The cluster also sent extortion messages to employees through Microsoft Teams, alleging data theft and pointing recipients to Tor-hosted negotiation sites.
Cluster CL-CRI-1274, tracked as Cinder, defeated Duo MFA through vishing by replaying a persistent session token from proxy infrastructure that keeps users signed in. The attackers then used scripted access through python-requests version 2.34.2 and the Microsoft Graph software development kit to collect and exfiltrate SharePoint and OneDrive data. CL-CRI-1274 also sent extortion messages internally via e-mail and Microsoft Teams, directing recipients to Tor-hosted negotiation sites.
CL-CRI-1192, which Google tracks as UNC6671, used a malicious browser extension called Google Chrome to steal credentials and session data from Chromium-based browsers. The extension, manifest version 1.6.111, was absent from the Chrome Web Store; it required manual sideloading through Developer Mode and a download from oskeysetup[.]com.
Unit 42 identified the extension during an investigation into the activity cluster Google tracks as UNC6671. It installs keyloggers, harvests authentication cookies, scans QR codes for login and multifactor authentication tokens, and streams webcam feeds. The extension also takes local and session storage and IndexedDB data from every site. It also creates a command-and-control link through Chrome DevTools Protocol, letting attackers control the browser remotely.
The module enables remote site navigation, hidden screenshots, dispatched input events and stolen clipboard contents, Unit 42 says. The company also uncovered a second malicious extension pretending to be Google Chrome, version 1.6.112, tied to the same command-and-control server and hard-coded API key.
The CL-CRI-1192 attackers created the extension as another way to steal credentials, targeting Chromium-based desktops and laptops running Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge, Unit 42 assesses with moderate confidence. Kevin Pham wrote a detailed September 2026 examination of the extension that Unit 42 recognized.
The actors used look-alike top-level domains for single sign-on portals, IT support pages and passkey setup pages to host phishing subdomains. They reused the Doko’s Panel adversary-in-the-middle phishing kit across campaigns. Some Okta-targeting variants replaced the default backend.php handler with a renamed endpoint, api_FyekIDWY.php, a variant Push Security reported and that Unit 42 observed on domains tied to Com-affiliated cases.
Microsoft flagged oskeyregister[.]com while researching passkey-themed social engineering. Unit 42 identified Cloudflare Pages addresses built on the connect-pages pattern that send visitors to organization-specific subdomains hosted on oskeyregister[.]com.
Com-affiliated threat actors follow no standard playbook and rely on native cloud utilities. Their persistence methods include signing up unauthorized MFA devices, creating temporary cloud credentials and approving unapproved third-party applications. They also approve unapproved third-party OAuth applications, set up secondary accounts and gather extra credentials.

Following authentication, the actors typically send traffic through residential proxy networks and commercial VPNs. For data removal, the actors relied on open-source utilities such as Rclone and native cloud programming interfaces, transferring data through SaaS-to-SaaS transfers and scripted HTTP-based methods from Microsoft 365, OneDrive and SharePoint.
Construction and high technology organizations often appeared, as did transportation and logistics targets. The United States held the most targeted organizations from August through October 2026. The targets held large amounts of high-impact corporate data, such as legal and corporate strategy documents, financial records and healthcare patient data. In some cases, the actors took tens of millions of customer relationship management and recruiting records.
Healthcare and life sciences targets received extortion notices through internal chat channels, with actors threatening regulatory reporting to add pressure. Targeted organizations generally operate distributed workforces and broad cloud collaboration platforms in English-speaking countries. The groups have gone back to the same organization weeks after an earlier attempt failed.
The Com-affiliated actors did not use encryption in their extortion campaigns, which let them move faster while keeping the same goals. Unit 42’s 2026 Global Incident Response Report says unencrypted extortion incidents hit 78% in 2025, falling under the 90% band for the first time in years.
GTIG says BlackFile, which it tracks as UNC6671, changed to Redact in June 2026 because an affiliate broke away. Redact operators announced the change and a new data leak site in a June 27, 2026 blog post, saying a rogue affiliate had compromised the original BlackFile brand. GTIG reviewed 18 BlackFile Bitcoin wallets that took in 141.65 BTC, worth about $10.69 million, from January 7 through May 12, 2026; the firm calls the funds probable extortion payments.
Shared templates and infrastructure link the Pink, Helix and Falcon brands as moneymakers, GTIG says. “This most likely reflects a coordinated group of threat actors operating multiple public extortion brands,” Google Threat Intelligence Group said.
BlackFile and Redact ran vishing scams that pretended to be IT help desks to reach enterprise employees and send them to fake login portals to steal credentials, using adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure. The operators reused generic root domains, including passkeyhelpdesk[.]com and passkeydeploy[.]com.
UNC6671 shifted targeting from manufacturing and healthcare to financial and legal organizations between April and July 2026. By July 2026 it focused on high-value financial and legal targets, including private equity firms and law firms.
A rogue affiliate ran an unapproved lookalike leak site and unauthorized extortion campaigns using BlackFile’s name and unlinked Tox identities. Officials blamed that affiliate for the supposed May 2026 shutdown of BlackFile.
Unit 42 tells organizations to tighten help desk verification and switch to phishing-resistant multifactor authentication such as FIDO2 or passkeys. It also recommends browser extension allowlists, visibility into identity actions and alerts for unauthorized data exports. GTIG also recommends phishing-resistant authenticators, single sign-on integration and authentication limited to trusted network sources.
SHA-256 hashes for folderextension.crx and folderextension.zip and the oskeysetup[.]com URLs that host them were released by Unit 42. It also published IP addresses 31.42.184[.]213 and 193.149.176[.]62 and a list of fully qualified domain names. Unit 42 posts key findings about Com-related infrastructure as Timely Threat Intelligence on its GitHub repository.

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