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Threat Actors

Google analysis finds Star Blizzard shifting to cloud identity compromise

Google's analysis links Star Blizzard to two US cloud breaches beginning in late 2025 and to new phishing operations in November 2026.

https://breach-signal.com/threat-actors/star-blizzard-cloud-identity-compromise/

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Key facts

  • The first intrusion occurred in late 2025 when Star Blizzard breached the cloud productivity setup of a US-based organization.
  • The actor kept access for several months, targeting cloud drive documents tied to credentials, email archives, personnel information and intelligence collection.
  • After removal, Google observed email accounts impersonating victim employees used to target people in the same professional circles.
  • The second intrusion followed Star Blizzard impersonating an employee of the first victim.

Google’s analysis, published Nov. 17, 2026, says Star Blizzard—also tracked as Cold Relic—is shifting from credential phishing toward compromising cloud identities for data collection and attacks on other organizations, based on two intrusions at US-based organizations that began in late 2025.

The company tracks the actor under names including Coldriver, Callisto, Cold Relic, Cold River, UNC4057, and Gossamer Bear, and it has been active for over a decade. The US has formally associated the group with Russia’s intelligence service FSB. Google reports that the group has breached NGOs, defense contractors and government officials across Europe and North America, and that it is known for spearphishing credentials from high-value targets in policymaking and defense sectors.

In late 2025, Star Blizzard breached the cloud productivity setup of a US-based organization and kept access for several months, using a US residential proxy network located near the victim, Google’s analysis says. The actor combined stolen super admin credentials with multifactor authentication push notification fatigue—a login attack that floods a user with approval requests—to gain entry, then relied on that fatigue to register a device to the victim’s tenant. After the user accepted an MFA request, it used super admin privileges to download the entire cloud storage drive, shared files to an attacker e-mail, and exported full employee lists through Google Workspace Customer Takeout, a data export feature. It also removed forensic evidence, including Alert Center notifications.

Google states that the intruders maintained entry for months by abusing passkeys—passwordless login credentials—unauthorized multifactor authentication hardware, and backup authentication codes. The actor stole e-mails and targeted cloud drive documents of interest. It kept access for several months, targeting cloud drive documents tied to credentials, email archives, personnel information and intelligence collection. It searched for credentials, employee information, email archives and documents for later spear-phishing attacks, and it also looks for organizational rosters, contact lists, resumes and schedules to build pretexts.

After access was removed, Google observed email accounts impersonating victim employees targeting people in the same professional circles. Google said Cold Relic’s impersonation of someone the new target knew from those circles made the phishing more likely to succeed.

The second intrusion followed Star Blizzard impersonating an employee of the first victim. The actor started a chat on a secure messaging app that ended with phishing links, and changed its profile name in that app, likely to reuse it in another attack. Google assesses that the attackers probably drew on details about contacts and relationships gathered from the earlier intrusion to pick and trick the next victim.

Google reported that the links provided credentials and tokens for Entra ID, the second victim’s federated single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. After authentication, the actor added a new multifactor authentication device to the SSO solution to keep account access. As in the first case, the group bulk downloaded files available in the compromised user’s cloud drive.

The company observed new phishing operations by the actor as recently as November 2026, indicating the group remains active. Google states that Russian intelligence services exploit staffing lists and operational paperwork to weaponize ordinary business correspondence in strikes against partners the target trusts. Google said Cold Relic’s campaigns blend social engineering aimed at people with the abuse of cloud identity.

Companies need to protect their full identity environment as a unified whole, since the threat actor moves across several cloud platforms, Google researchers argue. Google recommends enriching authentication logs with residential proxy and VPN reputation feeds. Conditional access policies should block or detect sign-ins from known proxy networks.

Cloud storage DLP—data loss prevention—policies should warn or block external sharing of files matching sensitive patterns. When a breach is detected, responders should end every active session and compel password changes on compromised accounts. Google also recommends phishing-resistant MFA, especially hardware keys that cannot be intercepted or approved through fatigue attacks. Organizations should restrict and audit passkey registrations.

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